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If You Do Not Know Who Knows What: Advice Seeking Under Changing Conditions of 
Uncertainty After an Acquisition 
 
Abstract 
In this study we develop a model to explain the dynamics of advice seeking after an 
acquisition. We build on a theory of advice seeking that draws from prospect theory and 
expectancy theory. We theorize that immediately after an acquisition there is uncertainty 
about who knows what, but over time individuals become more aware of the expertise within 
the organization and they change their advice networks based upon this increased awareness. 
Our model examines four micro-processes of advice seeking: reciprocity, preferential 
attachment, transitivity, and legacy-firm tie preferences. To test our hypotheses we use post-
acquisition data over four time periods in a recruitment consulting firm. Our longitudinal 
analysis uses a stochastic actor-orientated model and our results indicate that immediately 
after the acquisition individuals have a tendency to seek advice based upon reciprocity and 
preferential attachment. However, over time these tendencies diminish. Surprisingly, 
transitivity does not play a significant role, which suggests that other micro-processes such as 
reciprocity are dominant. In addition, individuals in the acquired firm have a tendency to 
make more ties and there is a preference for same firm ties in both legacy firms, with the 
tendency being higher in the acquired firm. Our findings add to theories on the process of 
advice seeking under conditions of uncertainty, on knowledge transfer processes in mergers 
and acquisitions, and the knowledge based view of the firm.  
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If You Do Not Know Who Knows What: Advice Seeking Under Changing Conditions of 
Uncertainty After an Acquisition 
 
The knowledge based view of the firm (Grant, 1996) suggests that the role of an 
organization is to integrate the knowledge of its employees. Likewise, there is a considerable 
body of research indicating that competitive advantage can be gained by having diverse 
knowledge within an organization (Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992). 
Having knowledge within a firm, however, is not sufficient for competitive advantage, the 
knowledge needs to be transferred between individuals (Argot & Fahrenkopf, 2016; Argot & 
Ingram, 2000). This often occurs through a process of one individual seeking advice from 
another (Lomi, Lusher, Pattison, & Robins, 2014; Reagans & McEvily, 2003; Tsai, 2001). 
Considerable research has focused on the processes by which knowledge is transferred across 
the organization (Lomi et al., 2014; Reagans & McEvily, 2003; Tortoriello, Reagans, & 
McEvily, 2012; Tsai, 2001) as well as on factors influencing advice seeking and giving 
between individuals within organizations, such as social status (Bapuji & Crossan, 2004; 
Borgatti & Cross, 2003; Kilduff & Tsai, 2003), homophily (Brass, 1985), formal structures 
(Brennecke & Rank, 2016), performance feedback (Parker, Halgin, & Borgatti, 2016) or 
friendship (McDonald & Westphal, 2003). In addition, a group of studies have explicitly 
examined the dynamics of advice networks over time and identified factors driving the 
emergence and evolution of advice relations in organizations (Agneessens & Wittek, 2012; 
Lazega, Lemercier, & Mounier, 2006;. Lazega, Mounier, Snijders, & Tubaro, 2012; Snijders, 
Lomi, & Torló, 2013; Tröster, Parker, van Knippenberg, & Sahlmüller, 2019).  
Yet, while these studies have shown important insights on advice network dynamics, 
their underlying assumption has been that the conditions under which the advice seeking 
occurs remain constant. This is surprising given that today's organizations are constantly in 
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flux as a result of organizational change, reorganizations, and mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) (Weick & Quinn, 1999). Therefore, a more satisfying theory of advice seeking would 
take into account uncertainty and how this can change over time.  
We develop a model that helps to explain the dynamics of advice seeking under 
changing conditions of uncertainty. In particular we focus on an acquisition event. We posit 
that immediately after an acquisition there is more uncertainty about who knows what, but 
over time individuals become more aware of where expertise resides within the organization 
and they change their advice seeking network based upon this increased awareness. We build 
from advice seeking theory (Nebus, 2006) that contrasts advice seeking decisions based upon 
having a rich awareness of what colleagues know and hence decisions are based on rational 
action; with situations of higher uncertainty where there is limited awareness of who knows 
what in the organization. Nebus' framework uses expectancy theory (Vroom, 1995) as the 
bases of decision making under relatively certain conditions and prospect theory (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979) for decision making in an uncertain environment. Within this framework 
our model examines four micro-processes of advice seeking: 1) reciprocity, which we define 
as the tendency for an individual to seek advice from those individuals that seek advice from 
them (Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 1960)1; 2) preferential attachment, which is the tendency for 
people to seek advice from those individuals that are already sought for advice by others 
(Barabási & Albert, 1999); 3) transitivity, which is the tendency to form relationships with 
“friends of friends” (Heider, 1946; Newcomb, 1961) or here with “advisors” of “advisors”; 
and 4) legacy firm tie preferences, notably the preference to make ties and whether these ties 
are within or between each legacy firm. We theorize that under conditions of higher 
uncertainty these tendencies will be prominent, but over time as uncertainty diminishes these 
                                               
1 Individuals can reciprocate advice through other means. Our focus is on advice seeking so we take a very 
narrow view of reciprocation and only theorize reciprocity in the context of the flow of advice within a dyad.  
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tendencies will change with the structural tendencies diminishing and the tendency for the 
acquired firm to make ties also reducing. 
To test our hypotheses we use data over four time periods in a recruitment consulting 
firm that had undergone an acquisition. Transferring complementary market and product-
based knowledge between legacy firms was one important rational underlying the acquisition. 
As this knowledge is highly tacit in both firms, advice seeking from other individuals 
constitutes the main means through which knowledge can be accessed and shared. In this 
particular case, high uncertainty about who knows what existed in the first period following 
the acquisition, as no prior contact between both firms and their personnel had taken place. In 
addition, the acquisition brought about changes in roles as a result of people leaving. This 
further increased the amount of uncertainty of who knows what within and between each 
legacy firm. Over time, as the integration took place, individuals had the opportunity to 
interact on a regular basis, resulting in decreased uncertainty. While there were people being 
hired and leaving throughout the time-period of the study this is likely to be less of an 
exogenous shock compared to the acquisition, as the change in one person is considerably 
smaller than that of many people joining a firm at the same time. To analyze the longitudinal 
network data we use a stochastic actor-orientated model that allows us to model the 
interdependencies in the network data and how they change over time (Ripley, Snijders, 
Boda, Vörös, & Preciado, 2019; Snijders, van de Bunt, & Steglich, 2010). Our findings add 
to theories on the process of advice seeking under conditions of uncertainty, M&A 
knowledge transfer, and the knowledge-based view of the firm.  
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Advice seeking and knowledge transfer  
A considerable body of research indicates that work-related network ties—the 
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relationships individuals have with work colleagues—can be a source of diverse information 
and social support that results in increased individual performance and productivity (e.g., 
Cross & Cummings, 2004; Reagans, & Zuckerman, 2001; Shah, Parker & Waldstrøm, 2017; 
Sparrowe, Liden, Wayne, & Kraimer, 2001). In particular, advice seeking ties have been 
shown to provide information to solve work related problems (Borgatti & Cross, 2003), they 
are also a source of meta-information about who has specific knowledge in an organization 
(Cross, Borgatti & Parker, 2001). Advice seeking ties are also an important way in which 
knowledge is transferred across organizational units (Caimo & Lomi, 2015; Lomi et al., 
2014). Some research has explicitly investigated the dynamics of advice networks over time 
and identified processes underlying the emergence and evolution of advice relations in 
organizations. Studying employees in a housing corporation, Agneessens and Wittek (2012), 
for instance, stress the influence of reciprocity at the dyad-level and of status at the triad-level 
as micro-processes shaping the emergence of advice ties. Lazega et al. (2006, 2012), studied 
the evolution of advice ties between judges in a commercial court and found evidence for the 
importance of status hierarchies and homophily in advice dynamics. Network centralization 
around an elite group of advisors tended to remain stable and eventually to oscillate as central 
advisors leave or are overloaded, a phenomenon the authors called the ‘spinning top model’. 
In a study of MBA students Snijders et al. (2013) find reciprocation and homophily in advice 
ties are largely mediated by friendship relations.  
A review of the M&A literature suggests that firms which have success in cross-firm 
knowledge transfer have better performance outcomes than those where knowledge transfer 
has not been achieved (Gammelgaard, Husted, & Michailova, 2004; Junni, Sarala, Tarba, & 
Weber, 2015; Zollo & Singh, 2004). In addition, knowledge transfer between the acquiring 
and the acquired firm is associated with efficient synergy implementation (Capron & Pistre, 
2002) and increased organisational efficiency through the exploration and exploitation of 
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complementary knowledge (Inkpen, Sundaram & Rockwood, 2000; Schoenberg, 2001; 
Westphal & Shaw, 2005). Several M&A scholars have underlined the social embeddedness 
of the knowledge transfer process. For example, Greenberg and Guinan (2004) stressed the 
importance of emergent social relations among individuals in their study of advice sharing in 
the course of an acquisition in the IT sector. Similarly, research stressed the importance of 
socio-cultural integration of both firms, i.e., in terms of work processes, work teams, rules 
and norms, as providing a more fruitful ground for knowledge transfer to occur (Bresman, 
Birkinshaw, & Nobel, 1999; Junni & Sarala, 2013; Sarala & Vaara, 2010). 
While there has been considerable research about the importance of knowledge 
transfer by macro-level scholars and advice seeking by more micro-level scholars there has 
only been limited research that has taken uncertainty into account when examining how 
knowledge is transferred within and between firms. In general, the findings suggest that when 
there is a high level of uncertainty individuals decrease the size of their advice network and 
tend to rely on the colleagues they have strong relationships with (McDonald & Westphal, 
2003; Parker et al., 2016; Srivastava, 2015). However, this line of research has examined 
general uncertainty in an organization as opposed to specifically examining uncertainty with 
regard to who knows what within an organization. In addition, none of these studies have 
explicitly examined how advice seeking network micro-processes change under different 
levels of uncertainty regarding who knows what. To explain this we turn to Nebus' (2006) 
theory of advice seeking.  
Nebus (2006) posits a theoretical framework of advice seeking that contrasts 
expectancy theory (Vroom, 1995), where individuals make decisions based upon a high 
degree of information about a situation; with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), 
where decision making occurs under conditions of uncertainty. Expectancy theory (Vroom, 
1995) suggests individuals who have rich information about the knowledge that a colleague 
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possesses will make a decision whether to approach this colleague based upon the expected 
value of the knowledge compared to the cost of obtaining the knowledge. If the value 
outweighs the cost they will approach them for advice. Alternatively, prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) indicates that when an individual has little information about 
the value of the knowledge an individual possesses, they base their decision on the 
accessibility of the individual and their perception of the willingness of a colleague to share 
their knowledge (Nebus, 2006).  
While Nebus’ (2006) theory of advice seeking was not developed specifically to look 
at post M&A advice seeking processes it can usefully be used as a framework for 
understanding changes in advice seeking after this type of exogenous event. In the following 
section we develop Nebus’ (2006) model of advice seeking in the context of an acquisition 
and theorize about four micro-processes—reciprocity, preferential attachment, transitivity 
and legacy-firm tie preferences—that constitute the advice network; we then hypothesize 
how these processes change over time as the level of uncertainty diminishes.  
 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
 After an acquisition event, there is heightened uncertainty about the pool of 
knowledge sources and the way to access these resources (Birkinshaw, Bresman, & Nobel, 
2010). As a result of the acquisition employees from different firms become part of the same 
company and there is an increase in the set of colleagues an individual can seek knowledge 
from. In addition to the increase of potential knowledge providers, another particular effect of 
acquisition led growth is that there is a global lack of knowledge on who knows what in the 
new organization. In acquisitions where there are no links between the two firms prior to the 
acquisition, employees find themselves having new colleagues whose knowledge and skills 
they know little about. This situation leads to uncertainties about how to identify and how to 
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access this new knowledge pool (Sarala & Vaara, 2010). In addition, some people usually 
leave a firm at the time of the acquisition which results in changes in roles within both legacy 
firms and increased uncertainty regarding who knows what (Lakshman, 2011). Furthermore, 
a person in a new role will often need to acquire a different type of advice and hence there 
will be increased uncertainty regarding where this advice can be best obtained both within 
and across legacy firms.  
 At the same time, along with the increased uncertainty of who knows what, there are 
also opportunities (Battilana, 2006). We suggest that individuals react to the exogenous shock 
of an acquisition by reassessing the way in which they go about doing their work which 
includes how they obtain advice from their network. Furthermore, we suggest that this 
reassessment does not just include whom to seek advice from in the newly acquired or 
acquiring firm, but also more generally with regard to all possible advice ties within both 
legacy organizations. Breaking out of old routines requires motivation and an acquisition 
event is likely to provide a driver for network change as it presents new opportunities for 
individuals to develop their advice seeking network (Battilana, 2006). There is also likely to 
be senior management emphasis on cross-legacy firm collaboration which will also motivate 
individuals to change their advice seeking behaviors.  
 Over time, however, there is likely to be a reduction in the level of uncertainty 
regarding who knows what within the newly integrated organization as people learn more 
about each other's knowledge and expertise. Research suggests that familiarity between 
individuals makes it easier to identify and exchange knowledge efficiently (Hinds, Carley, 
Krackhardt & Wholey, 2000). Therefore, we expect that as time passes after the acquisition 
event there will be changes with regards to how individuals utilize their advice seeking 
network.  
Reciprocal advice seeking  
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After an acquisition there will be an opportunity to gain valuable advice from new 
colleagues and also to re-evaluate the advice of existing colleagues. Prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) suggests that under conditions of higher uncertainty 
individuals will evaluate whom to seek out for advice based upon an individual’s likely 
willingness to share knowledge and expertise (Nebus 2006; Szulanski, 2000). One way in 
which to evaluate willingness to share is to give advice to an individual with the view that 
when they are approached in the future they will be willing to share advice. Research on 
reciprocity shows that when you give something you expect to receive something in return 
(Agneessens & Wittek, 2012; Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 1960). M&A research has also 
highlighted the importance of individual expectations regarding the reciprocation of 
transferring knowledge. Empson (2001) and Junni (2011) observed an increase in an 
individual’s fear of exploitation, when individuals’ felt that the sharing of knowledge might 
translate into losing personal power sources when it was not accompanied by the receipt of 
valuable knowledge. The giving and getting of advice can lead to trust and cooperation (Blau, 
1964; Friedkin, 2004), which in turn are important drivers of reciprocal knowledge exchange 
after an acquisition event (Bresman et al., 1999; Castro & Neira, 2005).  
In addition, there are normative pressures to give advice in return for receiving it as a 
lack of reciprocation can have a negative effect on an individual's reputation within an 
organization as well as reducing their future access to advice (Flap & Volker, 2001; Gargiulo 
& Benassi, 2000; Gouldner, 1960). After an acquisition the high level of uncertainty will 
increase the likelihood that individuals will reciprocate advice relationships as normative 
pressures will be heightened. Individuals have the opportunity to build their reputation by 
creating reciprocal advice relationships with people in the acquired or acquiring firm that 
were not previously known to them. In addition, the reputations of people within an 
individual’s own legacy firm will need to be reaffirmed as major change events such as an 
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acquisition can affect institutionalized roles within an organization (Barley, 1986) as well as 
power structures and status hierarchies (Blau, 1964; Brass & Burkhardt, 1992; Ibarra, 1993).  
Overall the increased desire to evaluate the advice of others and normative pressures 
based upon affirming and reaffirming reputation will result in a tendency for individuals to 
have reciprocal advice seeking relationships after an acquisition event.  
Hypothesis 1a: After an acquisition event, there will be a tendency for advice seeking 
reciprocity to occur. 
 
 While we would expect there to be a tendency towards reciprocity immediately after 
an acquisition, we suggest that the mechanism driving this tendency will diminish over time. 
There will be a move away from a mechanism based upon willingness to share as suggested 
by prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Nebus, 2006) to one in which advice 
seeking ties are based upon expectancy theory with a focus on whether the benefits of the 
potential knowledge that might be acquired outweigh the costs of obtaining the knowledge 
(Nebus, 2006; Vroom, 1995). This change in the mechanism is a result of the decrease in 
uncertainty regarding where the most useful advice is located in the network. Knowledge and 
expertise tend to be unevenly distributed in a network (Borgatti & Cross, 2003), which 
suggests that not every person has valuable advice to give and that not all advice giving will 
be reciprocated nor will it be expected to be reciprocated. While some reciprocal advice 
seeking ties will remain others will fall away as greater certainty regarding who are the 
optimum sources of advice re-establishes itself. In addition, the need to affirm and reaffirm 
reputation will recede as reputations become more stable within each legacy firm and across 
the acquiring and acquired organizations. Giving low value advice as a result of the desire to 
be seen as having a reputation for reciprocating will diminish with the re-asserted belief that 
not reciprocating is better for an individual’s reputation than reciprocating with advice of 
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little value. 
Overall, we suggest that the tendency for reciprocation will diminish the greater the 
time elapses after an acquisition. 
Hypothesis 1b: The tendency for advice seeking reciprocity declines over time after 
the acquisition. 
 
Advice seeking and preferential attachment  
As indicated previously, an acquisition event increases the level of uncertainty 
regarding where knowledge resides within an organization. There are individuals in the 
acquired and acquiring firm that are unaware which people possess the most useful advice. 
Therefore, from a prospect theory perspective individuals will seek out those who are most 
willing to share their knowledge (Nebus, 2006). The micro-process of preferential attachment 
in networks is one way that an individual will make a decision as to which colleagues to seek 
out for advice (Dahlander & McFarland, 2013). Preferential attachment is the uneven 
distribution of advice seeking ties in a network, whereby many people seek advice from a 
small number of colleagues (Barabási & Albert, 1999). An initial difference in who is sought 
out for advice can grow over time and this leads to a cumulative advantage effect or what 
Merton (1973) termed the Matthew effect.  
Status hierarchies within a network can also affect the tendency for some individuals 
to be sought out for advice more than others (Blau, 1955; Montgomery, 1996). M&A 
research suggests that status within knowledge networks can be attributed to key knowledge 
holders or experts who are indispensable to successful value exploration and exploitation 
(Reus, Lamont, & Ellis, 2016; Zollo & Singh, 2011). Status can also be associated with the 
way individuals perceive the value of their colleagues within the other legacy firm. Empson 
(2001) stressed the effect of individuals’ fear of contamination on knowledge sharing, which 
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occurs when individuals perceive others as having low quality knowledge and reputation. 
Similar effects about the perception of status differences have been put forth by Schweiger 
and Goulet (2005). Therefore, in a situation of high uncertainty there will be a tendency to 
seek advice from those that have high status, such as individuals whom many others seek 
advice from. While individuals who have more knowledge don’t necessarily have to share it, 
the giving of advice increases an individual’s status and hence, as most individual's desire 
status, there is a general tendency to give advice (Blau, 1955; 1964; Huberman, Loch, & 
Onculer, 2004; Loch, Yaziji, & Langen, 2001). 
Overall, the prospect theory explanation of advice seeking behavior suggests that in 
situations of uncertainty those that are seen as popular sources of advice will be further 
sought out for advice, resulting in a reinforcement of the tendency for preferential attachment 
to occur after an acquisition.  
  Hypothesis 2a: After an acquisition event, there will be a tendency for preferential 
attachment advice seeking ties to occur. 
 
We expect that as time progresses after an acquisition that employees knowledge of 
the best sources of advice will increase, hence there will be a move from decision making 
based upon prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) towards decisions being based 
upon expectancy theory (Vroom, 1995). Based upon an expectancy theory view of decision 
making, with regard to whom to seek out for advice, there should be a shift towards seeking 
advice from those that offer the highest knowledge gain at the lowest cost. This should 
decrease the need for individuals to depend on those individuals who are merely the most 
popular sources of advice and hence the tendency for preferential attachment will decrease.  
Those who are heavily sought for advice likely do have a considerable amount of 
knowledge, however some of the reason for their popularity might be because of their meta-
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knowledge, i.e., who knows what (Cross et al., 2001), as opposed to their technical 
knowledge. Therefore, as the general awareness of who knows what increases there will be 
less need to seek out the popular individuals for meta-knowledge. In addition, while 
popularity from giving advice results in higher status it also results in collaborative overload 
(Cross, Rebele, & Grant, 2016). While individuals can sustain collaborative overload for 
short time periods, they will be less willing to give advice to numerous colleagues over long 
time periods. Therefore, some advice seeking directed at popular individuals will be rebuffed 
or the responses will be quick and of low value (Dahlander & McFarland, 2013), resulting in 
the tendency for preferential attachment to decline over time after an acquisition event. 
Overall, the tendency for preferential attachment should decline as more awareness of 
who knows what in the organization increases and as individuals switch their decision 
making frame from a prospect theory perspective to one based upon expectancy theory.  
Hypothesis 2b: The tendency for preferential attachment in advice seeking ties 
declines over time after an acquisition. 
 
Advice seeking transitivity 
In situations of uncertainty, such as after an acquisition event, prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) suggests that there will be a tendency to seek advice from 
individuals who are more willing to share advice (Nebus, 2006). When an individual is 
looking around for advice one relatively obvious option is to ask the colleagues they already 
seek advice from if they know of another advice resource. From a network micro-process 
perspective this mechanism is called transitivity (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Transitivity in 
networks occurs when there are ties between three individuals that produce a triadic structure, 
i.e., each of the three individuals has ties to the other two. Transitivity has been found to be 
an influential mechanism in advice network evolution (Agneessens & Wittek, 2012). 
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Transitivity normally occurs in two stages, first the focal actor creates an advice seeking tie 
with a colleague. In the second stage, the focal actor creates an advice seeking connection to 
a colleague of the colleagues they initially had an advice seeking tie with. Triadic structures 
represent cohesiveness or closure in a network (Friedkin, 2004; Granovetter, 1973) as well as 
creating norms of trust and information exchange (Coleman, 1988; Obstfeld, 2005; Reagans 
& McEvily, 2003). Transitive ties are similar to reciprocal ties in that an individual’s 
reputation is at stake if they are not willing to offer advice to colleagues that they share a 
common third tie with. Therefore, from a prospect theory perspective individuals who are 
part of a transitive network structure should have higher willingness to give advice than those 
not part of a transitive network structure.  
In sum, after an acquisition where there is heightened uncertainty regarding who 
knows what, there should be a tendency for transitive ties to occur in the advice seeking 
network. 
Hypothesis 3a: After an acquisition event, there is a tendency for transitivity in the 
advice seeking network.  
 
In general, transitive structures are stable in which norms of commitment are 
reinforced by each individual being embedded in a closed triad. This is especially the case in 
friendship networks (Krackhardt, 1998). However, in more transactional networks such as 
advice seeking as awareness about where knowledge resides in the network increases there is 
less reason to develop and maintain advice seeking ties through “colleague-of-colleague” ties. 
We suggest that individuals will move away from their prospect theory perspective of 
decision making and adopt an expectancy theory view and seek advice from those individuals 
where the expected value outweighs the cost (Nebus, 2006, Vroom, 1995). The value of 
transitive ties is likely to diminish as awareness of who are the true experts on an issue 
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increases. The costs with regard to transitive ties are the likely need to reciprocate advice 
giving to two individuals. In addition, being part of a triadic structure likely necessitates 
creating a balance between both relational partners; too much time or energy spent with one 
partner may obligate an individual to undertake additional expenditures toward the other 
(Heider, 1946; Simmel, 1950). An individual is likely to view these costs as being too high, 
especially when the value of the advice received is not necessarily of as high quality as might 
be obtained elsewhere. Therefore, as the level of uncertainty regarding who knows what in an 
advice network increases the tendency for transitive ties will decrease.  
Hypothesis 3b: The tendency for transitivity in the advice seeking network declines 
over time after an acquisition. 
 
Advice seeking by legacy firms 
As mentioned previously, immediately after an acquisition there will be uncertainty 
regarding who knows what in the organization. M&A research has mixed findings with 
regard to the desire to interact with others across organizational boundaries. While some 
scholars stress a tendency towards in-group and out-group barriers (e.g., Cartwright & 
Cooper, 1996), others have found employees to be strongly motivated to relate to their new 
colleagues, especially in the first period following a firm’s integration (Teerikangas, 2012). 
Especially in professional service firms, and notably the consultancy sector, individuals’ 
willingness to exchange knowledge with the acquisition partner has been found highly 
determinant for integrating knowledge bases (Ejenäs & Werr, 2005; Junni, 2011). Given the 
fact that business development in this sector depends very much on the scope of market and 
client knowledge held by individual consultants (Ejenäs & Werr, 2005), the access to an 
entire new knowledge pool offered by the acquisition appears attractive. Research suggests 
individuals show in the first instance positive attitudes towards cross-firm interactions, 
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including knowledge sharing (Löwstedt, Schilling, Tomicic, & Werr, 2003).  
We suggest, however, that the tendency to have advice ties differs between acquired 
and acquiring legacy firms. Individuals within the acquired firm will see the opportunity to 
expand their advice network to a greater extent than those in the acquiring firm. This 
tendency will be for advice ties within and between legacy firms. The advantage of building 
more ties for those in the acquired firm is that it presents an opportunity for gaining new 
knowledge on markets and clients, although the quality and relevance of this advice will 
initially be uncertain (Empson, 2001). In addition to advice, ties to more people can 
potentially open up new opportunities with regard to access to resources as well as to new 
business opportunities and clients outside the firm. It is likely that interactions between 
individuals in the legacy firms will also be promoted by managers and the merger integration 
team, notably within the acquired firm. We suggest that there will be higher perceptions of 
the willingness of a colleague to share their knowledge within the acquired firm. This aligns 
with the prospect theory aspect of Nebus’ (2006) advice seeking model. It is also in the best 
interests of people in the smaller acquired firm to reach out within and across the legacy firms 
for advice. In contrast, employees in the acquiring firm will not be as motivated to have a 
preference for advice seeking ties, unless they are to individuals they already know in the 
acquiring firm. This is more aligned with expectancy theory (Vroom, 1995) whereby there is 
more certainty of who know what.  
In sum, we suggest that there is higher uncertainty regarding the knowledge and 
expertise of employees within the acquired firm, however the motivation to explore new 
opportunities and potential sources for individual learning, will result in individuals in the 
acquired firm undertaking more advice seeking than those in the acquiring firm.  
Hypothesis 4a: After an acquisition event, there will be a higher tendency for advice 
seeking ties by individuals in the acquired firm. 
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Over time greater awareness will develop as to the value of advice ties by those in the 
acquired firm and there will be a move away from the prospect theory mechanism of 
willingness to share under conditions of uncertainty (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The 
mechanism driving advice seeking will switch to one based upon expectancy theory, whereby 
an individual determines whether to reach out to a colleague for advice based upon the 
expected value and the cost of the advice (Vroom, 1995). As greater knowledge of who 
knows what is gained, some of the potential advice ties previously developed by those in the 
acquired firm will be seen as not being as valuable. Westphal and Shaw (2005) underline the 
significance of individuals’ attitudes towards each other in post-acquisition knowledge 
transfer, and these attitudes evolve as experiences develop. The initial opportunity-driven 
“tapping” into a new knowledge pool becomes more selective as time goes by and individuals 
develop a more in-depth awareness of whether what others know is of interest to them or not 
(Löwstedt et al., 2003). In addition, in situations where legacy firms maintain different 
organizational locations the effort required to reach out for advice by those in the acquired 
firm to a different location may outweigh the benefits of the knowledge that can be gained. 
Finally, after the initial enthusiasm has passed, employees in the acquired firm might fall 
back into old relation patterns (Tsang, 2008). This phenomenon has also been observed by 
Allatta and Singh (2011) when studying changing communication patterns after a merger 
over a three-year time window. Overall, as time passes after an acquisition the desire for ties 
by individuals in the acquired firm will decrease.  
Hypothesis 4b: After an acquisition the tendency for individuals in the acquired firm 





 Our study uses network data from a longitudinal single case study of an acquisition in 
the recruitment consultancy sector. The sample comprises a total of 42 consultants (30 of the 
acquiring firm and 12 of the acquired firm). Network data was collected through a network 
survey following the acquisition event and then every six months after the acquisition to all 
consultants of both legacy firms. In total we analyze four observation periods, covering the 
two-year period following the acquisition. Response rates vary from 91% to 100% according 
to the observation period. In addition, interviews were conducted at the time of the 
acquisition and one year post-acquisition with a sample of the consultants. As part of the 
interviews the consultants were asked about work practices, their work and support relations, 
as well as the change induced by the acquisition in their daily work, position within the firm 
and relationships to their colleagues, as well as whether they was any personal resentment 
about the situation. Table 1 gives an overview of both legacy firms and their population. 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 The recruitment consultancy sector is highly knowledge-intensive (Alvesson, 2004; 
Kipping, & Engwall, 2002) and one important objective underlying the acquisition was to 
ensure that knowledge transfer occurred between the legacy firms. Work practices, markets 
and clients were complementary in both legacy firms, and the management and employees 
from both sides perceived this complementarity as highly valuable at the time of the deal. 
Client bases were not overlapping as the acquirer dealt mostly with large groups and the 
acquired firm with SMEs. Work methods and processes differed with regard to techniques 
used to identify and contact potential candidates for a given job offer (headhunting at the 
acquirer and advertisements at the acquired firm), and market segments (top management 
positions at the acquirer and middle management and employees at the acquired firm). Also 
the focus of the work differed as consultants at the acquirer were specialized in a given 
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industry sector (for instance, banking & finance, logistics, healthcare, etc.) whereas 
consultants at the acquired firm are generalists, dealing with all types of industries and job 
positions. The acquired firm also had a personnel assessment tool that could improve the 
recruitment service provided by the acquirer. The senior managers believed there would be a 
benefit from each firm’s complementary expertise that would enable the new firm to propose 
enhanced and more encompassing services to clients. For the consultants, knowledge sharing 
across the legacy firms would enable them to develop individual skills and competencies in 
order to provide clients with enhanced services, combining expertise from both firms.  
In both legacy firms, knowledge is mostly tacit. No actual explicit knowledge base 
existed regarding processes, tools or market information. Even client information was very 
factual in the accounting based information system, giving no information about potential 
future needs or objectives of specific clients. Also no expertise directory or other knowledge 
data base was developed in the legacy firms, either before or after the acquisition. As 
knowledge mostly resided with the individual consultants, advice seeking constituted the 
main means through which knowledge could be accessed and shared. At the acquirer firm, 
consultants work in a large open space, a decision made by senior management to notably 
promote interpersonal communication and knowledge sharing. Also, consultants work on a 
given assignment in teams, most often in pairs of two consultants with different specialties 
(for instance for a recruitment of a CFO for a pharmaceutical company, a consultant 
specialized in finance would co-work with a consultant specialized in the healthcare sector). 
At the acquired firm, on the contrary, consultants worked mostly alone on assignments and 
occupied individual offices.  
Based upon discussions with managers and consultants, advice seeking across legacy 
firm boundaries between individuals should occur for three main reasons: learning new 
techniques from the other legacy firm to develop personal skill sets, access to information 
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about market trends and potential new clients to develop each consultants business portfolio, 
and getting insights about the different services and tools so as to be able to sell a combined 
offer to their clients.  
At the time of the acquisition, the consultants within both legacy firms were not 
familiar with each other. In addition, several people had left the firms, notably in the acquired 
firm. Overall, this resulted in a general reappraisal of who to seek advice from. This created a 
context of uncertainty where consultants, although being motivated to get into contact with 
their new colleagues as well as their old colleagues and learn more about their work 
processes and methods, were unsure who knew what, especially in the other legacy firm. In 
interviews, consultants in both firms regularly underlined that especially in the beginning, 
they had very limited insights on the operational activities of consultants inside the other 
legacy firm, and even less on the kind of competencies or skills they might possess. As one 
consultant indicated: “An important limit in seeking advice from somebody is the lack of 
knowledge of the others. It needs a lot of time to know who does what and who knows what. 
Even if we are just some hundred meters away, we do not cross each other so often, or even 
not at all.” Another consultant stated that: “I will not cross the street or take my phone to 
contact a person that I do not really know and who I did not see working. When I have a 
question, I turn to the persons I know, because I work with them.”  
 The promotion of interpersonal contacts allowing knowledge transfer to occur more 
easily was however an important concern for the acquirer’s management. On the leadership 
level, one of the acquiring partners became managing director of the acquired legacy directly 
after the deal had been signed. This allowed the partner to have close contact to the acquired 
legacy’s consultants and to learn more about their work and field of expertise. Within both 
legacy firms, partners were keen to put consultants into contact with each other and to help 
with identifying potential advice givers. In addition, senior management decided to move the 
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acquired firm’s office only one block away and thus closer to their own headquarters so that 
consultants could meet and exchange knowledge more easily. However, as pointed out by the 
quotes above, the closer physical location of the two legacy firms did not always enhance 
interactions between both groups, since these interactions did not occur “spontaneously,” but 
implied an intentional visit to the other firm’s office. In addition, eight months after the 
acquisition the management organized a one-day integration seminar. A further nine months 
later, work groups to determine common practices and synergetic opportunities were 
instigated. Also, cross-firm work collaborations on consulting assignments were financially 
incentivized to promote cross-firm relationships. The interpersonal contact that occurred 
during these events increased consultants’ awareness of each other's’ competencies and skills 
and also reduced initial reluctances to contact a member of the other firm directly. For 
example, a junior consultant indicated: “I have a better idea now of the different persons’ 
work and skills. We had several occasions to meet, so it’s easier now to know who to contact 
when I have a question.”  
Measures 
Advice network. The focus of our analysis is the changing network of advice ties. In our 
survey we measured advice seeking by asking respondents to indicate the people that they 
had sought advice from during the previous six months. Answer options for the advice 
seeking questions were 1 = sporadic one-time advice seeking, 2 = periodic advice seeking 
and 3 = regular advice seeking. Since we are interested in understanding advice seeking 
relationships that occur on at least a semi-regular basis, we chose to dichotomize the data at 
responses of two and above, i.e., periodic or regular advice seeking. For a discussion and 
analysis of the other two ways in which the data could be dichotomized see Appendix A.  
Endogenous processes of the advice network: The first three of our endogenous processes of 
interest measure overall network tendencies and our fourth process of interest specifically 
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examines interactions between the two legacy firms. Our measure of reciprocity accounts for 
the tendency for people who are sought by others for advice to reciprocate by asking for 
advice (Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 1960). There are various measures available to account for 
transitivity in a network. We use the transitive ties measure, which accounts for the tendency 
of an individual seeking advice from two people when there is also an advice seeking tie 
between those two individuals (Cartwright & Harary, 1956; Heider, 1946). More formally, if 
i (focal actor) has a tie to j and j has a tie to k, then it increases the likelihood of i forming a 
tie to k.2 Our measure of indegree popularity accounts for the tendency of individuals who 
are sought out for advice by many people to attract additional advice seeking ties (Barabási & 
Albert, 1999). Based upon the recommendation of Ripley et al. (2019) we have used the 
square root of indegree popularity in our model. Our measure of ego firm ties accounts for 
whether individuals in a specific legacy firm have a tendency to make ties, a positive 
parameter indicates that it is individuals in the acquired firm that have a greater tendency to 
make ties. We also include ties for alter firm and same firm as this will allow us to test which 
firm the two legacy firms are making ties to. Our alter firm parameter accounts for whether 
individuals in a legacy firm are more likely to have others seek them for advice, ties, a 
positive parameter indicates that it is individuals in the acquired firm that are more likely to 
be sought for advice. Our measure of same firm ties is based upon whether an individual has 
a tendency to make ties to others in the same legacy firm (a positive parameter) or in the 
other legacy firm (a negative parameter). 
In addition to the main effects of our four endogenous processes of interest we also 
include measures for time heterogeneity within the data, i.e., whether a variable is nonlinear 
over time (Schaefer, Light, Fabes, Hanish, & Martin, 2010). To do this we include a time 
                                               
2 There are numerous theoretical configurations of transitivity. Measures of these in the SIENA framework 
include six different measures of transitive triplets, as well as measures of balance and betweenness. We tested 
each of these in our model with no changes in the significance of the transitivity measure.  
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dummy variable for the second and third wave of data, i.e., T2 to T3 and T3 to T4. We 
include time dummies for each of our four endogenous processes of interest: reciprocity, 
transitivity, indegree popularity, ego firm ties (for further details see Lospinoso, 2010; 
Lospinoso, Schweinberger, Snijders, & Ripley, 2011). A positive parameter indicates an 
increasing tendency of the network effect over time with regard to the objective function and 
a negative parameter is a decreasing tendency of the network effect with regard to the 
objective function.  
Structural effect controls: We also control for other structural network tendencies in our 
model. The most basic measure we include is that of outdegree which accounts for the 
tendency of people to make advice seeking ties to others in the network, this can be viewed as 
the intercept in a SIENA model. As recommended by Ripley and colleagues (2019) we 
include an additional transitive measure, namely three-cycles. The three-cycles variable 
controls for the tendency for person i to seek advice from person j, person j to seek advice 
from person k, and finally person k to seek advice from person i, so forming a closed 
unidirectional triangle. When the three-cycles parameter is positive it indicates a tendency for 
generalized exchange (Malinowski, 1922; Yamagishi & Cook, 1993). 
 As suggested by Ripley et al. (2019) we also account for other degree distribution 
variables besides that of indegree popularity. The outdegree activity variable accounts for 
likelihood that people who seek out many colleagues for advice will seek out others in the 
next time period. The measure of outdegree popularity is the tendency of actors who seek 
advice from many of their colleagues to have others seek advice from them.  
Attribute effect controls: We also control for the possibility that individual attributes can 
affect micro-level processes of network change. There are three types of individual attribute 
or covariate variables that can be included in the model. First, ego covariate variables, which 
account for the tendency for individuals with high/low measures of an attribute to have 
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outgoing network ties. Second, alter covariate variables, which account for the tendency for 
individuals with high/low measures of an attribute to be sought out by others (incoming ties). 
Third, an attribute similarity effect, which accounts for the tendency for people with the same 
(or similar) attributes to have ties with each other. 
It is possible that individuals possessing certain types of attributes will seek out more 
advice from others or be sought out for advice by more people. Therefore we include ego and 
alter effects for hierarchy (hierarchy ego and hierarchy alter), tenure (tenure ego and tenure 
alter), gender (gender ego and gender alter), and age (age ego and age alter) since an 
individual who is more senior, older, or who has been with a firm longer may be more likely 
to be know others or be sought out by them for advice. Since individuals are likely to have 
relationships with people who are similar to them (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001) 
we account for homophily based upon tenure (tenure similarity), gender (same gender), age 
(age similarity), hierarchy (hierarchy similarity) and specialization (same specialization).  
Time period controls: Our SIENA model includes rate effects variables, which account for 
the underlying opportunities for change in the network. We model them for each wave of our 
data (for further details see Ripley et al., 2019).  
Method of analysis  
We examine the micro-processes of network change at four points in time after an 
acquisition event. To analyze our data we need a modeling framework that takes into account 
the dependencies between the cases and the changes in the network over time. To do this we 
use an actor-orientated Simulation Investigation for Empirical Network Analysis (SIENA) 
modeling framework in the RSiena software package (Ripley et al., 2019). The SIENA 
framework is a stochastic actor-orientated model which assesses the probability of different 
types of network change. The model can account for network structural changes such as 
reciprocity, and changes concerning individual attributes such as age (Snijders et al., 2010). 
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The model has certain assumptions such as changes in network ties being continuous and that 
these changes are based upon a Markov process (Snijders et al., 2010). In addition, an actor is 
only able to change one tie a time and hence individuals are restricted from coordinating 
changes (Snijders et al., 2010).  
There are two processes that are modeled in the SIENA framework: change 
opportunity and change determination. Change opportunity is the expected rate of change of 
each individuals’ network ties and is modeled as a rate function for each wave in the study 
(e.g., T1 to T2, T2 to T3, etc.). Change determination is the probability of an individual 
changing their network in a certain way, i.e., by adding a tie or dropping a tie. Change 
determination is modeled as an objective function containing micro-steps. In each micro-step, 
an actor that is randomly selected, examines all possible changes to their network with a view 
to maximizing their objective function. The objective function for the network is as follows: 
ƒi(β,x) = Σ βk Ski (x) 
k 
In the equation, ƒi (β,x) is the objective function with i being the focal actor and x the 
network. The function Ski (x) is the effects on the network from the perspective of i. These 
effects include the tendency for reciprocity or transitivity as well as the tendency of people 
with a certain individual attribute, such as gender or age, to change their network ties in a 
certain way. In the model, βk is the weight of the change. The significance of a parameter is 
calculated by comparing the t-ratio, i.e., the estimated parameter divided by standard error, 
with a standard normal distribution. 
Missing data in SIENA models. We address missing data in two ways. First, individuals are 
coded as structural zeros if they are not present in the dataset during a specific time period, 
for example, if they have not yet joined the firm or if they have left the firm. By coding them 
as structural zeros it means they do not have ties and other individuals do not have the option 
to make ties to them (Ripley et al., 2019). In addition, we follow the suggestions of Huisman 
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and Steglich (2008) with regard to missing data due to non-responses. We coded non-
responses as NA and allowed RSiena to handle missing data internally. The missing data is 
imputed for the simulations during the parameter estimation, but is not directly used for the 
parameter estimation. This method has been shown to best decrease bias from having missing 
data (Huisman & Steglich, 2008). In our data the amount of missing data ranges from 1.4% in 
the first period to a high of 8.6% in the final period. This is well within the 20% maximum 
amount of permissible missing data that would potentially make the simulation unstable 
(Ripley et al., 2019). 
 
RESULTS 
In Table 2 we present descriptive statistics for each of the four time periods in our 
study. The average density varies from 0.057 to 0.115, with a general trend of increasing 
connectedness in the advice network. However, there is a decreasing tendency for reciprocity 
from 0.361 in the first wave to 0.215 in fourth wave. The number of ties within the acquirer 
firm rises over time, while the ties between the legacy firms first increases and then 
decreases. The descriptive statistics highlight that there is an overall increase in the number 
of advice ties. In contrast, the micro-processes of network change are not necessarily aligned 
with this overall network change.  
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 In Figures 1a-d are visual representations of the network at the four times points in 
our analysis. From the network diagrams it is clear that there is clustering of advice ties 
within each of the legacy firms. This is particularly noticeable at T1. Even by T4 there is still 
notable differentiation between the advice ties of the acquired and acquiring firm. The overall 
growth of the firm is also noticeable in the figures. In T1 there are 17 triangles on the left of 
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the diagram indicating individuals who had not joined the firm at that time period. By T4 
there are only four triangles indicating that four individuals had left the firm by that time 
period.  
<Insert Figure 1a-d about here> 
  Table 3 details tie changes over time in the advice seeking network. Between the first 
two waves almost 91% of dyads continue to have no advice seeking tie between them, 
whereas between the last two waves this has decreased to 82%. The number of advice 
seeking ties that are maintained between waves ranges from 2.5-8.1%. In comparison the 
number of ties added ranges from 4.2-6.5%, and advice seeking ties dropped ranges from 2.4-
3.3%. The overall amount of network change during the four periods is measured by Jaccard 
coefficients (Snijders et al., 2010). In a network where all ties change the coefficient’s value 
is zero and when no ties change the value is one. The Jaccard coefficients range from 0.337 
to 0.401 in the advice seeking network in our data. This is within the appropriate range for 
SIENA models where high levels of change (below 0.3) are problematic for the convergence 
of the model (Ripley et al., 2019). 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
  Our SIENA model shows good convergence as all t-ratios are all less than 0.1 and the 
overall maximum t-ratio convergence is 0.17 (Ripley et al., 2019). In addition, we also 
calculated goodness of fit statistics for the indegree, outdegree, geodesic distributions and 
triad census and find that the test p-values are all above the recommended level of 0.05 
(Ripley et al., 2019). Violin plots for the goodness of fit statistics are detailed in Figure 2. 
The red line shows the observed value and the violins show the distribution of values 
simulated by the model. The dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval. Overall, we are 
able to conclude that the simulated networks in the SIENA model are a good fit with the 
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changes in the actual network. 
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
In Table 4 we detail the results of our SIENA model. The parameter estimates in a 
SIENA model framework are log odds ratios. Negative parameter estimates indicate a 
tendency to not have a certain type of network micro-process, whereas positive parameters 
show a tendency for the particular micro-process. An examination of our structural network 
control variables indicates there is a positive but not significant three-cycles parameter 
indicating there is no tendency for generalized exchange. The negative and significant 
outdegree popularity parameter suggests that there is a tendency for actors who seek advice 
from many of their colleagues being likely to have others that seek advice from them. The 
positive and significant outdegree activity parameter indicates that individuals who seek out 
advice from many others have a tendency to continue to do so.  
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
In our attribute controls we find a positive and significant effect of tenure alter 
indicating that people have a tendency to seek advice from others with more experience in the 
firm. There is also a cohort effect (tenure similarity) with people tending to seek advice from 
those of a similar level of tenure. There is an age ego effect indicating a tendency for older 
employees to have more advice ties. In addition there is a homophily effect for specialization, 
indicating a tendency to seek advice from those in the same specialization. This homophily 
tendency is to be expected in the workplace. 
Finally, the network rate parameter is the average number of opportunities for change 
by each actor within the simulations of the SIENA modeling framework. The rate parameter 
measures the opportunity for change in the simulation rather than actual change, with some 
opportunities for change leading to no change and others resulting in a change that is later 
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cancelled out, e.g., adding a tie and then dropping it (see Ripley et al., 2019 for further 
details). The opportunity for change between T1 and T2 is 2.440, from T2 to T3 it is 4.090 
and from T3 to T4 it is 10.335. The large difference in the rate parameter between the last 
two time periods is because of the increase in the amount of change in the network with more 
adding and dropping of ties (see Table 3) resulting in greater volatility in the opportunities for 
change.  
Our results in Table 4, indicate a positive and significant reciprocity parameter which 
supports Hypothesis 1a that after an acquisition individuals have a tendency to reciprocate 
advice seeking ties. An examination of the time dummy variables for reciprocity indicates 
that from T2 to T3 there is a negative parameter and T3 to T4 there is a negative and 
significant parameter, indicating that the reciprocity parameter contributes less to the 
objective function over time. This offers some support for Hypothesis 1b that the tendency 
for reciprocity diminishes the more time elapses after the acquisition. The indegree 
popularity parameter is positive and significant providing support for Hypothesis 2a that after 
an acquisition there is a tendency for people to reach out to the most central people in the 
advice network. The time dummies for indegree popularity follow a similar pattern as for 
reciprocity with a negative parameter from T2 to T3 and a negative and significant parameter 
for T3 to T4, indicating that the indegree popularity parameter contributes less to the 
objective function over time. This provides support for Hypothesis 2b that the tendency to 
seek advice from the most central people in the advice network diminishes the greater the 
amount of time that elapses after the acquisition event. The parameter estimates for transitive 
ties is positive and not significant and the estimates for the time dummies are not significant. 
There is no support for a tendency for transitivity after the acquisition, nor any nonlinear 
change in the parameters. Therefore there is no support for Hypotheses 3a and 3b. Finally the 
parameter for firm ego ties is positive and significant. Individuals in the acquired firm have a 
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tendency for advice ties compared to those in the acquiring firm. Therefore there is support 
for Hypothesis 4a. The time dummies are negative and significant for T2-T3 and T3-T4, 
indicating that the firm ego parameter contributes less to the objective function over time. 
This suggests that the tendency of individuals from the acquired legacy firm to seek advice 
decreases. This result supports Hypothesis 4b. 
In additional analysis we constructed an ego-alter table to allow us to see the overall 
tendency of people in the two legacy firm to create ties and whether these ties are to same 
legacy firm or a different legacy firm. In Table 5, individuals in the acquired firm have a 
positive tendency to create ties to both colleagues in their own legacy firm (1.461) but also to 
the acquiring firm (0.806). Individuals in the acquiring firm have a low tendency for cross-
legacy firm advice ties (-0.073) and a somewhat low tendency for same legacy firm ties 
(0.206). 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
DISCUSSION 
Our analysis reveals that in the initial stages after the acquisition when uncertainty of 
who knows what is high there is a tendency for people to seek advice based upon the micro-
processes of reciprocity and preferential attachment. This is in accordance with decision 
making based upon the tenets of prospect theory where under conditions of uncertainty 
individuals choose to seek advice from colleagues they believe will be willing to share advice 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Nebus, 2006). There is no support for our transitivity 
hypothesis and we return to this later in this section. In addition, we do find support for the 
tendency for the acquired firm to seek advice. This tendency decreases over time. In 
supplemental analysis we find that individuals in the acquired firm had a tendency to make 
ties with both legacy firms, this was much less the case for individuals in the acquiring firm. 
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This is despite there being considerable organizational support from senior management to 
share knowledge across legacy firm boundaries in the immediate aftermath of the acquisition 
event.  
The results indicate that there is a nonlinear relationship over time for some of our 
hypothesized variables. As time progresses after the acquisition event we suggest that 
individuals have a greater understanding of where knowledge resides in the network. This 
results in a decrease in uncertainty and decision making that is based on a more rational 
perspective that is in accordance with expectancy theory (Nebus, 2006; Vroom, 1995). Our 
results show a decline in the tendency for reciprocity and preferential attachment and a 
decline in the acquired firm to make advice seeking ties. This suggests a move towards 
decision making based upon evaluating the costs and benefits of network micro-processes, 
with the benefits of reciprocal ties, preferential attachment ties and a preference by the 
acquired firm to make ties being outweighed by their costs. In the following section, we 
discuss how this research addresses gaps in existing knowledge. We then highlight the 
managerial implications and opportunities for future research.  
Theoretical contribution  
Our research sheds some light on how individuals adapt their advice seeking networks 
under changing conditions of uncertainty—in our case after an acquisition event. Previous 
research has indicated that in times of high uncertainty individuals have a tendency to 
contract their network (McDonald & Westphal, 2003; Parker et al., 2016), whereas in 
situations of low uncertainty individuals develop their networks (Parker et al., 2016). 
However, the focus of these previous studies has been about general uncertainty and on the 
number of ties. In contrast, our focus is specifically related to uncertainty with regard to who 
knows what in an organization and we examine more nuanced micro-processes as opposed to 
just whether individuals increase or decrease the size of their network. Importantly, we 
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extend an existing model of advice seeking (Nebus, 2006) that explains how changes in the 
level of uncertainty result in changes to the way in which decisions are made regarding the 
network micro-processes of advice seeking. We show that initially after an organizational 
shock, i.e., an acquisition, there is a tendency for reciprocity and preferential attachment to 
people popular in the advice network, but this tendency diminishes over time. Our reciprocity 
finding aligns with that of Quintane, Pattison, Robins and Mol (2013) who indicate that 
reciprocal relationships in teams tend to occur as a result of the need for task related advice in 
the short-term, which does not necessarily translate into the need for long-term reciprocity. 
We also show that there is an initial tendency for advice seeking by the acquired firm, but 
over time this tendency diminishes.  
Our hypotheses on transitivity were not supported. This is surprising since other 
studies reported the positive effect of transitive closure on advice seeking practices (e.g., 
Agneessens & Wittek, 2012). The lack of support for our transitivity hypotheses could be for 
several reasons. The fact that transitivity does not structure the advice seeking network in the 
first period after the acquisition may be directly related to the uncertainty of who knows 
what. Since individuals are not aware of many of the knowledge holders, especially those 
within the other legacy firm, they can accordingly not recommend a valuable knowledge 
source to their related colleagues (Borgatti & Cross, 2003). And by the same token, the 
context of uncertainty might also limit an individual recommending one of their new 
colleagues as being a valuable knowledge source before being more certain about his or her 
actual value as a source of advice. Overall, the lack of transitivity suggests that in this 
particular case other network micro-processes are dominant, notably reciprocity and 
preferential attachment.  
We also contribute more generally to M&A research by identifying the network 
micro-processes of advice seeking that influence knowledge exchange and transfer after an 
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acquisition event. Previous research underlined the importance of effective knowledge 
transfer for M&A success, but fell short of providing a more in-depth picture of the factors 
that drive this process, especially on the level of individuals (e.g., Empson, 2001; Greenberg 
& Guinan, 2004; Junni & Sarala, 2013). We add to this research in particular by highlighting 
the network mechanisms underlying the first crucial steps of the knowledge transfer process 
(Cummings & Teng, 2003), i.e., the identification and access of individual knowledge 
sources, studied here through advice seeking behavior. We also contribute to research 
investigating motivational dimensions of cooperation and knowledge exchange in M&A 
(Teerikangas, 2012; Empson, 2001) as well as to work investigating the role of social 
embeddedness of knowledge transfer processes in M&A (Ranft & Lord, 2002; Tsang, 2008). 
In line with Teerikangas (2012), we notably observe that, at least initially, the acquired firm 
employees take the acquisition as an opportunity to develop their networks and resources. 
Further, our network micro-processes approach gives us a different perspective on the social 
embeddedness of knowledge transfer processes, allowing us to highlight in a much more 
tangible way the influence of relationships and individual embeddedness in social groups and 
structures.  
Third, we also add to the literature on the knowledge-based view of the firm (Grant, 
1996). Prior research suggests that knowledge is more easily transferred within a firm than 
between firms (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Conner & Prahalad, 1996). One explanation for why 
a merger or an acquisition occurs is to increase the opportunity for transferring knowledge 
within a firm with the external firm boundary now encapsulating both legacy firms. Our 
findings indicate that while the acquired firm did reach out across firm boundaries this was 
much more limited for the acquiring firm. This suggests that boundaries are not fully 
malleable and that simply changing a firm’s external boundary to encapsulate another firm is 
not sufficient to facilitate advice seeking in the long term. Research on advice seeking has 
34 
shown that people have a preference to develop ties within the boundaries that they identify 
with (Lomi et al., 2014). We show that while exogenous shocks to the organization, such as 
an acquisition event, can jolt people out of their existing work routines, the tendency for 
inertia remained for individuals in the acquiring firm.  
Managerial implications  
Our research has shown that in conditions of high uncertainty as to who knows what, 
decisions regarding advice seeking depend on perceived willingness to share as opposed to 
seeking out the most knowledgeable person about an issue. Immediately after an acquisition 
it would be helpful to create greater awareness of expertise throughout the network. This will 
encourage people to reach out to the most relevant source of advice rather than the one that is 
the most willing to give advice. Expertise directories that include both work and non-work 
expertise can help promote knowledge of what others know as well as encouraging 
engagement between employees (Cross, Parker, Prusak, & Borgatti, 2001). In addition, senior 
managers can promote a culture of knowledge sharing and trust within an organization. This 
can be done, for example, by promoting a norm that every person has the right to ask advice 
from any other person or by explicitly building in a knowledge sharing component into 
annual evaluations (Cross & Parker, 2004).  
Furthermore, we have shown that networks have a tendency to return to their original 
state once the enthusiasm after a change has ebbed away. Managers should continue to 
promote cross-firm advice seeking for a long period of time after an acquisition event has 
taken place. Cross-firm advice seeking can be encouraged by bringing together people from 
each legacy firm in task groups based aimed at improving internal processes or improving 
delivery of services to clients (Cross & Thomas, 2009).  
Limitations and future research 
In our research we were able to gather four waves of data which allowed us to 
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develop valuable insights into the micro-processes of change in the advice seeking network 
after an acquisition event. However, we only examine one acquisition and replication of our 
findings would increase the robustness of our results. In addition, to avoid survey fatigue we 
were not able to gather data on individual traits. One avenue for future research would be to 
examine if advice seeking micro-processes differed based upon personality traits such as the 
Big Five personality factors or self-monitoring behavior (Fang, Landis, Zhang, Anderson, 
Shaw, & Kilduff, 2015). Our focus has been on advice seeking as we believe this was the 
most pertinent network to examine in the context of a recruitment consulting firm. In other 
organizational change events it could be of value to examine a different type of network such 
as who individuals are energized by or the dynamics of trust under changing conditions of 
uncertainty. An additional avenue for future research would be to link individual network 
tendencies to an outcome measure such as performance. It would then be possible to ascertain 
if there was a change in performance for individuals that switched from a prospect theory 
approach to decision making with regard to advice seeking ties to an expectancy theory 
approach.  
Conclusion 
Extensive research has shown that knowledge transfer within organizations can lead 
to competitive advantage. Most work in this areas has focused on the overall benefits of 
sharing knowledge at a point in time. We develop a dynamic model of advice seeking that 
examines decision making with regard to knowledge seeking under changing conditions of 
uncertainty. We show, that after an acquisition event where there is high uncertainty as to 
who knows what, there is an initial tendency for reciprocity, preferential attachment and 
acquired firm advice seeking ties. However, these initial tendencies wane over time as 
uncertainty of who knows what decreases. Our findings generate new insights into the role of 
the micro-processes of network change under conditions of uncertainty after an acquisition 
36 
event. We hope others will build from this work and examine network micro-processes under 
other dynamic conditions. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Network Statistics for Each Time Period 
 T1 T2 T3 T4 
Density 0.057 0.076 0.096 0.115 
Number of ties 98 131 165 198 
Ties within acquirer firm 78 86 119 175 
Ties within acquired firm 14 11 13 6 
Ties between legacy firms 6 34 33 17 
Average degree 2.333 3.119 3.929 4.714 
Degree standard deviation (out) 3.530 3.941 5.509 6.595 
Degree standard deviation (in) 2.981 4.101 4.120 4.188 
Reciprocity 0.361 0.272 0.310 0.215 
Transitivity 0.429 0.359 0.368 0.449 
Average geodesic distance 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 
Number of nodes 25 32 34 38 






Table 3. Tie Change Statistics Between Each Time Period 







Period 1-2 90.8% 4.2% 2.4% 2.5% 0.337 
Period 2-3 87.6% 5.3% 2.3% 4.7% 0.401 








Table 4. SIENA Model of Advice Seeking Micro-Processes 
Effect Parameter Std. Error 
 Rate function   
  Rate 1 2.440 0.416 
 Rate 2 4.090 0.561 
 Rate 3 10.335 1.550 
Intercept   
 Outdegree  -6.361*** 0.835 
 Time dummy T2-T3 Outdegree 4.636* 2.045 
 Time dummy T3-T4 Outdegree 3.786 2.009 
Control variables: Network     
 Three-cycles 0.117 0.106 
 Outdegree popularity (sqrt) -0.444* 0.223 
 Outdegree activity (sqrt) 0.617*** 0.082 
Control variables: Actor   
 Age alter -0.007 0.014 
 Age ego 0.066** 0.020 
 Age similarity -0.106 0.672 
 Tenure alter 0.065** 0.024 
 Tenure ego -0.046 0.025 
 Tenure similarity 2.135*** 0.620 
 Hierarchy alter 0.076 0.100 
 Hierarchy ego -0.178 0.113 
 Hierarchy similarity -0.098 0.287 
 Gender alter -0.305 0.164 
 Gender ego -0.103 0.182 
 Same gender 0.114 0.146 
 Same specialization 0.819*** 0.189 
Main variables   
 Reciprocity 1.796*** 0.458 
 Indegree popularity (sqrt) 1.044*** 0.235 
 Transitive ties 0.072 0.291 
 Same firm 0.467* 0.221 
 Firm alter 0.188 0.238 
 Firm ego 1.067* 0.423 
 Time dummy T2-T3: reciprocity -1.390 0.913 
 Time dummy T3-T4: reciprocity -1.830* 0.886 
 Time dummy T2-T3: indegree popularity (sqrt) -0.113 0.575 
 Time dummy T3-T4: indegree popularity (sqrt) -0.115* 0.564 
 Time dummy T2-T3: transitive ties -0.031 0.715 
 Time dummy T3-T4: transitive ties 0.599 0.758 
 Time dummy T2-T3: firm ego -3.089* 1.266 
  Time dummy T3-T4: firm ego -2.848* 1.246 
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
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Table 5. Ego-Alter Table 
 
  alter 
  acquirer acquired 
ego 
acquirer 0.206 -0.073 



























































 The data we collected allow for different levels of dichotomization. Overall, we 
believe that for theoretical reasons our chosen level of dichotomization—‘periodic’ and 
‘regular’ advice seeking—is appropriate for our research question. The lower level of 
dichotomization (greater or equal to one) includes the category of ‘sporadic one-time advice 
seeking’. This results in an approximately 50% increase in the number of ties compared to the 
dichotomization level used in the results section of the paper. Including ‘sporadic one-time 
advice seeking’ changes the overall structure of the model and results in a different set of 
micro-processes. We detail the results in Table A1. At this level of dichotomization: 
reciprocity, outdegree activity, and same specialization are prominent drivers of change in 
the network. The T2-T3 time dummy for firm ego is also significant indicating that the 
tendency of individuals from the acquired legacy firm to seek advice decreases over time. 
The higher level of dichotomization only includes ‘regular advice seeking’ and the 
number of ties drops by approximately 50% at each time period compared to dichotomization 
that includes ‘periodic’ and ‘regular’ advice seeking . This results in considerable change to 
the structure of the network and a resulting change to the micro-processes. We detail the 
results in Table A2. At this level of dichotomization: reciprocity, indegree popularity, 
outdegree activity, and same firm are prominent. In addition, the T2-T3 time dummy for firm 
ego is also significant indicating that the tendency of individuals from the acquired legacy 
firm to seek advice decreases over time at all levels of dichotomization. For ‘regular advice 
seeking’ people go to a small number of close colleagues. It is only when the dichotomization 
is relaxed to include periodic advice seeking that people go beyond their close network of 
colleagues and we start to see more choices being made about who to go to for advice and 
that these choices change as the level of uncertainty changes over time.  
<Insert Table A1 and A2 about here> 
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Table A1. SIENA Model of Advice Seeking Micro-Processes (dichotomized at 1 and above) 
 
Effect Parameter Std. Error 
    Rate function     
    Rate 1 2.675    0.518 
    Rate 2 2.147    0.383 
    Rate 3 6.151    1.131 
  Intercept     
    Outdegree  – 7.040***    1.268 
    Time dummy T2-T3 Outdegree 0.435    1.709 









 Control variables: Network     
    3-cycles  –0.040    0.296 
    Outdegree popularity (sqrt)  –0.896    0.494 
    Outdegree activity (sqrt) 1.026***    0.233 
  Control variables: Actor     
    Age alter  –0.031    0.028 
    Age ego 0.081**    0.029 
    Age similarity 0.993    1.118 
    Tenure alter 0.117*    0.047 
    Tenure ego  –0.091*    0.042 
    Tenure similarity 3.063**    1.062 
    Hierarchy alter 0.478*    0.222 
    Hierarchy ego  –0.055    0.239 
    Hierarchy similarity  –0.940    0.573 
    Gender alter  –0.591*    0.285 
    Gender ego 0.398    0.368 
    Same gender  –0.183    0.248 
    Same specialization 1.581***    0.365 
  Main variables     
    Reciprocity 3.419***    1.035 
    Indegree popularity (sqrt) 0.603    0.424 
    Transitive ties 0.422    0.371 
    Same firm 0.718    0.383 
    Firm alter 0.763    0.424 
    Firm ego 0.399    0.522 
    Time dummy T2-T3: reciprocity 0.567    1.420 
    Time dummy T3-T4: reciprocity  –0.441    1.312 
    Time dummy T2-T3: indegree popularity (sqrt) 1.112    0.883 
    Time dummy T3-T4: indegree popularity (sqrt) 1.224    0.866 
    Time dummy T2-T3: transitive ties  –1.830    0.959 
    Time dummy T3-T4: transitive ties  –0.037    0.882 
    Time dummy T2-T3: firm ego  –3.405*    1.504 
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    Time dummy T3-T4: firm ego  –1.154    1.031 




Table A2. SIENA Model of Advice Seeking Micro-Processes (dichotomized at 3)  
 
Effect Parameter Std. Error 
  Rate function     
    Rate 1 4.456    0.709 
    Rate 2 7.383    0.836 
    Rate 3 11.983    1.473 
  Intercept     
   Out-degree   –5.435***    1.451 
    Time dummy T2-T3 Outdegree 0.372    0.753 
    Time dummy T3-T4 Outdegree  –2.400    4.133 
    Control variables: Network      
    3-cycles 0.027    0.067 
    Outdegree popularity (sqrt)  –0.250    0.232 
    Outdegree activity (sqrt) 0.512***    0.065 
    Control variables: Actor     
    Age alter  –0.012    0.011 
    Age ego 0.029    0.016 
    Age similarity 0.176    0.458 
    Tenure alter 0.038*    0.017 
    Tenure ego  –0.031    0.020 
    Tenure similarity 1.257**    0.483 
    Hierarchy alter 0.184*    0.092 
    Hierarchy ego 0.037    0.115 
    Hierarchy similarity 0.024    0.245 
    Gender alter  –0.246    0.128 
    Gender ego  –0.005    0.133 
    Same gender 0.135    0.116 
    Same specialization 0.475**    0.153 
 Main variables     
   Reciprocity 0.765**    0.277 
    Indegree popularity (sqrt) 0.451***    0.129 
    Transitive ties 1.243    1.498 
    Same firm 0.681***    0.195 
    Firm alter 0.038*    0.017 
    Firm ego  –0.031    0.020 
    Time dummy T2-T3: reciprocity  –0.371    0.404 
    Time dummy T3-T4: reciprocity  –0.640    0.417 
    Time dummy T2-T3: indegree popularity (sqrt)  –0.129    0.262 
    Time dummy T3-T4: indegree popularity (sqrt)  –0.123    0.267 
    Time dummy T2-T3: transitive ties 0.252    0.680 
    Time dummy T3-T4: transitive ties 2.800    4.423 
    Time dummy T2-T3: firm ego  –0.913*    0.402 
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    Time dummy T3-T4: firm ego  –0.636    0.377 
Note: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
 
